Publikationer

Research | Forskning - peer review

This paper examines the legal concept of occupation of territory and its historic application to the Polar regions, to disclose the fallacies at the heart of the colonial projects at both Poles. It also considers how the increasing recognition of non-use value disrupts positivist accounts of occupat… This paper examines the legal concept of occupation of territory and its historic application to the Polar regions, to disclose the fallacies at the heart of the colonial projects at both Poles. It also considers how the increasing recognition of non-use value disrupts positivist accounts of occupation. The colonisation of populated lands was justified by European theories of property that insisted that effective occupation required both a psychological and a physical element. The psychological element of occupation requires the sovereign to engage in a legal action that it controls the land and exercises dominion over it but this conceit is not shared by Arctic Indigenous Peoples. The physical element of occupation according to the positivist account requires an owner or sovereign to transform the land in some physical manner. The self-serving European legal theories construed the Indigenous relationship with land as a non-relationship and declared it retrospectively terra nullius. According to their own laws, the colonisers declared their own sovereign authority over Indigenous territories, notwithstanding the existing civilisations. However, in the Polar regions, the colonisers themselves did very little in the way of physical occupation or transformation of the vast majority of the lands that they claimed. Colonisers demonstrated occupation through the naming of places, mapping, taking resources, building basic structures for shelter, and applying laws over their own people. But Indigenous Peoples had long been doing all those things in the Arctic. 20th century courts accepted that in territories remote from the colonising claimant with little or no population, the degree of physical occupation and exercise of jurisdiction could be very limited. However, they refused to consider the much longer and more extensive use and management by Indigenous Peoples. In the Antarctic, the territorial claims of the seven claimant states do not pivot on any real physical occupation or transformation of the land at all. This would have been impossible on any scale of significance, given the size and challenging climate of the continent at the time of European discovery. Today, the principles that govern the Antarctic continent favour non-use and a minimisation of impacts. At both Poles, justifications for the exercise of jurisdiction are increasingly based on promises to protect wilderness by minimising human impacts. Sovereignty is demonstrated through non-occupation in a complete reversal of the classical legal theory. Læs mere

Research | Forskning - peer review

This article discusses the history of international law in respect of colonisation, from Francisco de Vitoria to the present day. It reveals the inconsistencies and injustices with regard to Indigenous Peoples that continue to constrain their rights to self-determination today on an equal basis with… This article discusses the history of international law in respect of colonisation, from Francisco de Vitoria to the present day. It reveals the inconsistencies and injustices with regard to Indigenous Peoples that continue to constrain their rights to self-determination today on an equal basis with other Peoples. By deconstructing the legal explanations for the occupations of the polar regions, it demonstrates the contradictions at the heart of the colonial project and challenges international lawyers, in particular “positivist” international lawyers, to re-evaluate their hypotheses regarding occupation and state sovereignty. It highlights the gaps between the theory and practice of occupation of the polar regions and questions the legitimacy of states’ territorial claims. Instead, it shows that Indigenous occupation in the Arctic is much older and legally stronger than that of any state. Læs mere

Research | Forskning - peer review

On February 25, 2019, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965. The judges held by a majority of 13:1 that the process of decolonisation of Mauritius is incomplete, owing to the separation… On February 25, 2019, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965. The judges held by a majority of 13:1 that the process of decolonisation of Mauritius is incomplete, owing to the separation of the Chagos Archipelago shortly before Mauritian independence, that the United Kingdom should end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, and that all Member States of the United Nations should cooperate to complete the decolonisation of Mauritius. The (partial) decolonisation of Mauritius in 1968 and the treatment of the Chagos islanders (Chagossians) have important parallels with the purported decolonisation of Greenland in 1952–54. In both cases, the consultative body of the colonised people was neither fully independent nor representative of all the people concerned. No real choice was given to either body; rather the colonial power offered only the continuation of the status quo or professed self-determination on terms defined by the colonial power itself. Furthermore, the process of decolonisation was inherently linked to the forcible transfer of people in order to make way for a United States military facility. Nevertheless, there are some relevant differences. First of all, Greenland was purportedly decolonised in 1953, some seven years before the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UNGA Res. 1514(XV) 1960). Second, the UN General Assembly accepted the Danish government’s representations regarding the full decolonisation of Greenland (UNGA Res. 849 (1954), in contrast to their position regarding Mauritius that decolonisation was and remains incomplete, owing to the separation of the Chagos Archipelago (UNGA Res(XX) 1965). Third, though the Chagossians have been recognised as indigenous at the UN, the British government has continually denied this status and (mis)characterises them as a transient people, while Denmark has accepted the status of the Greenlanders as both an indigenous people and a colonial people, entitled to self-determination. This article examines the implications for the judgment for the Greenland case as well as broader questions of self-determination of peoples. It concludes that the colonial boundaries continue to govern in decolonisation cases, with the consequence that the Greenlanders are likely to be held to be a single people; that the erga omnes character of the right to self-determination means that all States must cooperate to facilitate Greenlanders’ choices for their future; and that there remain significant procedural hurdles that prevent colonial and indigenous peoples having their voices heard, even in the matters that concern them most of all. Læs mere